Matthew Benton Seattle Pacific University
Prior to that he was a postdoctoral research fellow in the Center for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Notre Dame ( ), and in the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Oxford ( ). I received a small grant from this project to research and write articles on linguistic honesty and on interpersonal honesty. The linguistic part looks at how we represent ourselves honestly or dishonestly in linguistic communication. This sort of humility means we still value those we disagree with. We listen to them respectfully, centering them and the reasons, experiences, and beliefs behind what they hold dear.
Or, we might downgrade the evidence as less important, perhaps not even as evidence against our view. Something similar can happen with ideas which may not involve relationships, but which are nevertheless very dear to us. Politicians argued about climate change, and individual Americans clashed over everything from masking requirements to vaccine mandates. Despite the presumably unifying power of faith, even those in church pews across America couldn’t find common ground on most of these issues.
Recent epistemology offers an account of what it is to know other persons. Such accounts hold promise for illuminating several issues in philosophy of religion, and for advancing a distinctive approach to religious epistemology. This paper develops an account of interpersonal knowledge, and clarifies its relation to propositional and qualitative knowledge (§1).
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- He argues that this necessary condition importantly captures nearby cases as lies which the traditional view neglects.
- And before that, I did my Ph.D. in Philosophy at Rutgers University.
- Instead, Christians have the opportunity to model respect for others for a broader culture that sees too little of that from us.
- Often, the big issue is how to proceed given the many voices which disagree — and how to proceed when many rachet up the disagreements as a way of muddying the waters.
“Finding Common Ground through Religious Disagreement,” interview with Jamie Aten, Hope + Resilience blog, Psychology Today, April 23, 2021. “In All Things, Charity,” interview with Shelly Ng, SPU Stories, June 23, 2022. Review of John Pittard, Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment (Oxford University Press, 2020), in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, Sept. 30, 2020 (online).
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One thing I try to develop is a sense of which sources are trustworthy, and why. All of us tend to think there are truths to be known, or at least truths that we can get a bit closer to, even Matthew Benton blog in the difficult terrain of morality and politics. In epistemology we discuss what makes believing something rational. Before moving to Seattle I was a postdoctoral research fellow in philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, and before that, a postdoc and Junior Research Fellow at the University of Oxford. And before that, I did my Ph.D. in Philosophy at Rutgers University. But others will feel slighted if certain people they are close to, or who they want affirmation from, do not side with them, so I think it depends on the topic and those who are disagreeing, especially with regard to how they treat each other.
Matthew Benton
In this paper we present some implementation problems for defeatism, understood along either internalist or externalist lines. We then propose that one who accepts a knowledge norm of belief, according to which one ought to believe only what one knows, can explain away much of the motivation for defeatism. But in fact, Grice is a traitor to their cause; or rather, they are his dissenters, not his disciples. Drawing on Grice’s unpublished papers, I show that he thought of asserting as a special linguistic act in need of its own norm, and he tied his maxim of Quality to knowledge. I also develop a simple Gricean-inspired argument showing that the Quality maxim is not dependent on the Cooperative Principle. If it is not thus dependent, then the Cooperative Principle cannot be the explanation of, or source of normativity for, the Quality maxim.